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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of a proportional capital gains
tax in an economy with an Austrian sector (with wine and trees) and an
ordinary sector. We analyze the effect of capital gains taxation (on both
an accrual and a realization basis) on the
efficiency with which resources
are used within the Austrian sector. Since time is the only input which
can be varied in the Austrian sector this
amounts to looking at the effect
of capital gains taxation on the harvesting time or selling time of assets.
Accrual taxation decreases the selling time of Austrian assets. Realiza-
tion taxation decreases the selling time of some Austrian assets and leaves
it unchanged for others. Inflation further reduces the selling time of
assets taxed on an accrual basis; often, but not
always, inflation increases
the selling time of Austrian assets taxed on a realization basis. These
results suggest that the capital gains tax can reduce the holding period
of an asset. However, there is a sense in which such taxes (at least when
levied on a realization basis) discourage transactions and increase holding
periods. It is never profitable to change the ownership of an Austrian
asset between the time of the original investment and the ultimate harvesting
of the asset for final use. We examine the
effect of capital gains taxa-
tion on the efficiency of the allocation of investment between sectors.
No neutrality principles emerge when ordinary investment income is taxed
at the same rate as capital gains income.
We also analyze the effect of the special tax treatment of capital
gains at death and find that the current U.S. tax system, under which
capital gains taxes are waived at death, encourages investors to hold
assets longer than they otherwise would.
Michael Rothschild Daniel J. Kovenock
Mathematica, Inc. Department of Economics
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University of Wisconsin
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I. Introduction
This paper examines the effects of a simple capital gains tax in an
economy with an Austrian sector and an ordinary sector. In the ordinary
sector the investment process is simple and straightforward; an investment
of a dollar produces a stream of returns in the future. Assets in the
Austrian sector do not yield a stream of services. They increase in
value as they age; when they are harvested this growth stops. The stan-
dard examples of Austrian investments are wine and trees, and we shall
use these terms to refer to two different kinds of Austrian assets. Trees
are assets which require scarce resources —— i.e., ones which earn rents ——
while they age. In considering when to cut down a tree it is important
to take account of the fact that the land on which a tree now stands
can be used to grow another tree once its present occupant is felled.
Wine, in distinction, uses no scarce resources as it matures; the casks
and cellars in which wine ages earn no rents.
We focus on the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian invest-
ments for two reasons. First, the effects are simple and straightforward.
We are able to obtain exact expressions for the effect of capital gains
taxes on the allocatjTon of investment between sectors and for the efficiency
of resource use within the Austrian sector. We extend some of this analysis
to the case where the death of the investor (which has significant tax
consequences in the U.S.) is uncertain.1
In an earlier version of this paper, we also considered the effect of
uncertainty about the growth of Austrian assets; since the main conclusion
of that exercise was that considering uncertainty did not change the
character of our results, we have drop?ed it from our paper.
Secondly, a capital gains tax affects the timing of transactionS.
With Austrian assets these effects have real, easily—understood con-
sequences. Most previous studies, empirical and theoretical,2 have,
implicitly or explicitly, focused on the effect of capital gains taxa-
tion on purely financial assets. It seems clear from first principles
that capital gains taxes should, at least in an inflationary world,
operate as a kind of turnover tax, inhibiting the sale of stocks and
bonds which show gains and encouraging the sale of assets on which
losses have been incurred. Constantinides (1980) and Constantinides and
Scholes (1980) have shown just how appealing the strategy of realizing
losses and never selling gains can be when well—organized futures
markets with low transactions costs exist. Feldstein, Sleinrod, and
Yitzhaki (1980), Feldstein and Slemrod ( 1978), and Feldstein and
Yitzhaki (1978) have presented evidence that this theory is correct ——
that the capital gains tax does indeed inhibit the sale of assets whose
prices have increased since they were purchased. It is not clear,
at
least to us, what the real effect of such an inhibition is. In general,
sales of stock are purely financial
transactions and do not lead to invest-
ment or disinvestment of real assets. ile it seems quite likely
that
the volume of transactions has some effect on the efficiency of the
allocation of investment, to our kno1edge, no one has framed a theory
which will allow us to deLer the preferred volume of transactions.
Without such a theory one cannot say whether discouraging transactions
is good or bad.
2Lippn and McCall (1980) is a significant e:ception.
Our analysis assumes that capitaa gains taxes fall only on Austrian
assets. Thus we can only analyze the effect of the capital gains tax
on Austrian assets. The ordinary sector is in our model for two reasons;
first, we assume that it is sufficiently large that the after—tax rate
of return —— which in our simple model is the social discount rate ——
is determined outside of the Austrian sector and is independent of the
rate and form of the capital gains tax. Secondly, having an ordinary
sector allows us to examine the effect of capital gains taxation on the
allocation of resources between Austrian and other investments.
We summarize our results as follQws. Section I sets out the basic model
and analyzes the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian investments.
Our partial equilibrium model assumes that the total amount of investment is
fixed. Taxation, in particular the capital gains tax, can affect economic
efficiency in two quite different ways. First taxes can affect the flow of
investment between sectors. The intersectoral allocation of investment is
efficient when the present discounted value of all returns ——public and
private —— from a dollar of investment is the same in all sectors. We find
that when income in the ordinary sector is taxed at rate and capital gains
in the Austrian sector are taxed at rate T, this equality is unlikely to
hold, even if T = T In particular, when tax rates in the sectors are equal,0
Austrian investments have lower total returns than ordinary investments.
While not without interest, this cornparison is quite artificial. A
major accomplishment of recent research on the ta::ation of capital has
been the demonstration that T is an axtraordinarilv conplicated beast.
0 -
As the endproduct of the complex interaction of nan provisions of the
tax law, cannot be identified with anything so sn-1e as the corporate
income tax. ThuE it is hard to conceive of a realistic tax change
which could set T = T.0
Another effect of capital gains taxation is on the allocation of
resources within a sector. For Austrian investments, the resource whose
use can be varied is time; we find that the capital gains tax leads to
inefficiencies within the wine sector by encouraging wine to be sold
more quickly than it would be in the absence of taxation. This does not
hold for some tree investments. If investment opportunities are stationary,
and if there is no inflation, cutting time is independent of T and capital
gains taxation introduces no distortions. If conditions are not stationary,
or if there is inflation, taxes affect cutting time in a complicated way.
These results were obtained for taxation on a realization basis.
Accrual taxation introduces different distortions. When T T total0
returns from Austrian investments (both wine and trees) can be greater
or less than returns from ordinary investments. For a given rate of
taxation, selling time (again for wine and trees) is less under accrual
taxation than under realization taxation. We have made comparisons of taxation
at equal rates rather than equal yields because such comparisons are simpler.
However, as Stiglitz (1981) has shown, the problem of calculating the effective
yield of a capital gains tax is sufficiently complex that it seems no good case
can be made for the proposition that comparisons of taxes which have equal
yields are more meaningful than comparisons of taxes which have equal rates.
Our model produces no strong a priori case for the greater efficiency of
accrual taxation. Our examination of the effects of inflation in Section II
strengthens the case for realization as opposed to accrual taxation. Although
there are exceptions, on balance inflation (at least rapid inflation) tends to
alleviate the distortions caused by taxation on a realization basis while it
5complicates, sometimes exacerbating and sometimes alleviating the distortions
caused by accrual taxation.
In Section III we show how the
analysis is changed by
taking account of the special ways in which capital gains are, or could be
taxed, at death. We show how the present United States tax system, which
allows automatic step up of basis at death, encourages' people to hold
on to assets longer than they would otherwise. Since the tax system leads
them to sell wine sooner than they should, at least for wine this
corrects (and possibly overcorrects) a distortion of the tax system.
Much previous work on capital gains taxation has focused on the way
in which capital gains taxes tend to inhibit transactions and to encourage
investors to hold assets —— at least assets which are growing in value ——
longer than they otherwise would. Our analysis suggests that the effects
are diverse and complicated. The results suiamarized above showed that
the capital gains tax could sometimes shorten, sometimes lengthen, and
sometimes leave unchanged the length of time the owner of an Austrian
asset would wait before he harvested it. However, we did obtain one result
which shows that the capital gains tax discourages transactions in Austrian
assets. In Proposition 3 below we show that the owner of an Austrian asset who
is subject to capital gains taxation on a realization basis will never
sell it to another interediate producer. He will always nake higher
profits by holding on to wine until it is sold to the consicaer. Although
Proposition 3 is stated for wine, it also clearly holds for trees. Thus
the capital gains tax acts as a kind of tu:ncver or transaction tax on
Austrian assets and as such prornotes vertical integration in industries
which use ,ustrian processes.
We have sacrificed a great deal of reality to keep our models simple
and tractable. The capital gains tax is proportional and everyone pays
the same rate. We ignore the complexities and arbitrage opportunities
which are encouraged by progressive taxatian at different rates.3
We also ignore the arbitrage opportunities which the options market
permits. Constantinides (1980) and Constantinide-s and Scholes (1980)
have argued th.at by using the options imarket, investors can avoid ever
realizing capital gains. Sales of assets (which are taxable events) are
dominated by the purchase and sale of options (based on the asset's
future value) which can be written in such a way that taxes are avoided
or deferred. This argent loses some of its force in an Austrian model.
Assets must be sold eventually or the tree rots or the wine goes bad.
Row the existence of an active options market would affect our results
is an interesting question which we have not examined.
We have also assumed that investors have a very simple goal. They
maximize the present discounted value of wealth. We assume a constant
discount rate of r. When we treat uncertainty we assume that investors
are risk neutral so that they maximize the expected present discounted
vue of wealth. Thus we ignore both risk aversion and portfolio effects.
We make this choice for two reasons. First, it's what we can do. Second,
while it is not fol1y difficult to introduce risk aversion into me
3 Lippman and 1cCal1 (1980) analyze a sinilar model in w'ricb t:es
are progressive.
of our models, we are uncertain as to how to interpret the results.
Suppose an investor's portfolio contains assets which will be harvested
at different dates; risk aversion is not adequately treated by assuming
the same concave function values wealth received at each date. To handle
risk aversion a more complex model — presumably one with consumption —
is needed. A further simplification is obtained by our treatment of death.
We assume that investors place the same value on wealth which their heirs
realize as on the wealth they receive if they harvest an asset.
Appendices explain the notation and contain the details of some of
the calculations.
8I. The Basic Model
A. The Ordinary Sector
A dollar invested in the ordinary sector yields a constant stream of gross
returns y. We abstract from the entangling detail of the real world by
assuming a simple proportional tax. Thus, after tax returns are y(l — T0)
where is the tax rate in the ordinary sector. The tax rate cannot be
identified with any single parameter of the tax code such as the corporate
profits tax. Auerbach (1979) and others have analyzed the complex ways in
which the provisions of the tax la combine to produce If the stream of
returns is not constant, -r0 is even more complicated.
1. The After Tax Rate of Return.
We define the after tax rate of return r as the solution to
—rs
(1) 1= fy(l—T)e ds.
0
Thus, y = r/(l - T0). Since r is the rate of return available in the
ordinary sector in a competitive economy it is the rate which all investors
will use to discount all future benefits. In a complete model r will be
determined by the interaction between tastes (particularly time preference),
technology and endowments. In this paper we analyze the effects of changes
in parameters, particularly tax parameters, which do not affect the ordinary
sector. Since these parameters shifts leave r unchanged, we can use r to
assay the effects of such changes on economic efficiency.
2. Gross Returns and the Value of Investment.
If government revenues are used efficiently —— or if, equiva-
lently, proceeds of taxation are returned to taxpayers — a dollar of tax -
revenue collected at time t is worth e_t. Thus the taxes collected from
an investment project yielding a stream of returns y( ) have a present
discounted value of I y(s) Tersds which, because of (1), is equal to
T/(l — T). Thus a dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces a
stream of returns which is worth 1 + T/(l — T) = (1 — dollars when
both private benefits and the value of tax benefits are considered. The
fact that a dollar of investment produces more than a dollar's worth of
benefits, can lead to complications. Anything that increases savings and
investment increases welfare. If proceeds of investment are reinvested they
are worth more than if they are consumed. By positing mechanical rules for
reinvesting proceeds of investment projects, we could derive alternative
formulae for valuing dollars of investment. Our concern in this paper is
with valuing investments in different sectors and it does not seem worth-
while to follow this line of analysis, at laast in part because to follow
it we would need to assume that the allocation of investment between sectors
was also fixed mechanically. Another way of aking the same point is to
say that we are assuming that the total an:nt cf investment is fixed. Given
this we examine the efficiency of the allocstfon of resources to investment,
both within and between sectors.
B. Austrian Sectors
In the economy there are also Anstrn n.'estnent opportunities.
Austrian investments are point input1 tsfnt prs. An investment
at an initial time to produces an asset which has a value of X(t — t) if
the asset is harvested and used for
consumption at time t.
1. Wine and Trees.
We consider two kinds of Austrian production processes. In the
first, and simpler, an initial investment produces an asset which increases
in value as it ages. We call the
output of this process wine. The other
Austrian output, a tree, is distinguished from wine by the fact that it
uses a scarce resource, land, as it ages. When a tree is felled, another
can be planted in its place. When iine is drunk, the bottle in which it has
matured is discarded. We need terms to describe the time when an Austrian
asset's maturation is terminated and it is consumed. For trees "cutting
time" seems appropriate. For wine we shall call this time
"selling time."
This usage is justified in Proposition 3, below where it is shown that the
capital gains tax discourages transfers of wine before it is consumed.
Since the argument of Proposition 3 can be adapted to trees, we shall also
occasionally use selling time to refer to trees and wine together.
2. Values and Rates of Return Without Taxes.
Suppose that there are no taxes in the Austrian sector. In equili-
brium assets invested in the Austrian sector must earn a rate of return
equal to r. If they ear-ri a rate of return greater than r, the value of
resources used to produce wine will be bid up until the rate of return is
just r. If B is the value or price of resources used to produce wine
which has a value of X(t) when sold or harvested after t years,
—rtB = max e x(t).
We will define t as the solution to this maximization problem.
In
equilibrium, scarce resources in the other Austrian
sector (trees)
also earn the competitive rate of
return, but since the scarce resource,
land, is not used to produce trees but to provide a place for them to
mature, the analysis is slightly different.
If trees can be planted at cost F, the present discounted value of a
plot of land which can support one tree forever is, if trees are harvested
at intervals of length u, and if the value of a tree of age u is V(u),
(2) L(u) =
—P + (V(u) — F) e + (V(u) — P)e2' +
=
—P + (V(u) P) (e - 1)-i.
The optimal cutting period u is chosen to maximize L(u); if used in the
Austrian sector this plot of land has a value of L(u). If used in the
ordinary sector it has an alternative value, say L. It is used in the
Sector in which it has the higher value.
C. Capital Gains Taxes, Realization.
In this section we analyze the effects of capital gains taxes which
are levied on a realization basis. In the next section we analyze the
effects of capital gains taxes levied on a accrual basis.
1. Wine.
Consider an investment in vine which if harvested and sold at time
t, will yield X(t). If the wine initially costs B, capital gains are
[X(t) — B). If capital gains are taxed when realized at rate T net proceeds
are
(x(t) — B)(l — T) + B = x(t)(l — T) + TB.
The cutting time is chosen to maximize the present discounted value of these
net proceeds. In equilibrium investments earn the competitive rate of return
so that B satisfies.
(3) B = Max e_t[X(t)(l — T) + TB) = e_rt*[X(t*)(l_T) + TB)t
where the selling time t maximizes the present discounted value of the
investor's after tax profits. In interpreting (3) it should be kept in mind
that r, T and X( ) are parameters while B and t are chosen to satisfy (3).
If r and XC ) are held constant B and t are functions of T. B is the value
of the investment opportunity represented by X( ). If the real cost of the
resources used to produce X( ) cost less than B then these resources will
be used to produce wine; conpetition will cause the value of these resources
to rise to B. If they coEt nore than B, the wine which has the value
stream x( ) will not be produced.
The present disconte value of the total returns to an investment of
_rt*
B dollars in wine is X(t)e . We can rewrite (3) to see that
(1t*)
13
Let ci denote the present discounted value of the return to one dollar
invested in wine. Then
_rt*
cx (1—Te )/(l—T).
A dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces returns with a total dis-
counted value of (l—T0). The reason why these formulae differ is easy to
understand. Considered solely in terms of costs and returns on invest-
ment ine is like an ordinary investment which requires an initial
investment of B and returns X(t), t periods later when it is sold• If
it were taxed as an ordinary investment, the tax base would be X(t), tax
revenues would be TX(t) and the total return from a dollar's worth of invest—
—1
ment would be (l—T) . Since investments in wine are taxed as
capital gains the tax base is not X(t) but X(t) — B. We summarize this
discussion in
Proposition 1: The present discounted value of total returns from a dollar
invested in wine is less than the present discounted value of total returns
from a dollar invested in the ordinary sector if and only if
_rt* —1(4) (l—Te )/(l—-r) < (l—)
4
There is a slight, and inessential, technical difference. In order to
use continuous time we assume that returns from ordinary investments are
flows while returns from Austrian investments are stocks.
1L4
If r - T, then returns to investments in the ordinary sector are greater
than returns to investments in wine. If i > T , then returns to investments0
in wine may or may not be greater than returns to ordinary investments.
Since different kinds of wines may have different selling times (different
t*) it is quite possible that some wine investments may have greater and
some lesser total social returns than ordinary investments. In interpreting
the condition T < it is well to keep in mind what a complicated parameter
T is.0
The value of B determines the allocation of resources to the wine
sector. As B increases more resources are devoted to the production of
wine. Whether or not this increases or decreases economic well—being
depends on (4). In contrast, the parameter t determines the efficiency
with which resources in the wine sector are used. The value of all
resources devoted to wine grows according to the function X( ). Since the
social discount rate is r, the wine should be allowed to mature until £
where £ maximizes.ertX(t). Assuming, as we shall, that x'(t)/X(t) is a
decreasing function, £ is the unique solution to
A A(5) X'(t)/X(t) = r.
However, the selling time for wine, t*, is chosen to maximize
private return not social return; t satisfies not (5) but (3), thus t
must satisfy
(6) X' (t*)/X(t*) = r(l +
This establishes
15
Proposftion2: t < t.
In interpreting this proposition it should be remembered that while
each wine investment may have a different
socially optimal selling
time £ and a different privately optimal selling time t*, for all such
investments the privately optimal time is too short. Were it to increase,
the resources allocated to the wine sector would be used more efficiently
and the present discounted value of the output of the wine sector would
increase. Like proposition 1, proposition 2 is a consequence of the form
of capital gains taxation. If wine were taxed as ordinary income the after
tax return would be X(t)(l—T) and t*would be chosen to maximize (lT)X(t)e_'t
so t would equal 1.
A high basis increases the value of an asset subject to capital gains
taxation. it is conceivable that this effect could be strong enough to
encourage turnover of assets like wine. Working against this is the fact
that capital gains taxes are also turnover taxes and thus they inhibit
transactions. We show in Proposition 3 that this latter effect dominates.
Proposition 3. No wine is sold before it is consumed.
Proof: Suppose first that the basis is 0. In this case the wine will be
consumed at the same time as it would be were there no tax. The value of
holding the wine to maturity is
= Max e_rtX(t) (l—T) = (l—T) Max e_rtX(t) = (l—T)W°.
t t
If the person sells the asset iediately for a price S he will net, after
taxes, only (l—)S. Thus he will be better off selling only if S(l—T) >
(l—T)W° or if S > W°. oever, it is sy to see that no person facing the
capital tax will pa;.' Dore than W0 to buy the asset. A prospective
buyer is viliThz to pay only S where S is a solution to
16
S = Max TSjert = ert X(t*) (1—i) + ISert.
t
Thus
_rt* _rt*S[1 — Te 3 = e X(t*)(1.T)
or
S = e_t*X(t*)
l_Tett
< e1X(t*) < Max e_rtX(t).
If the basis is B, then wT(B) > W(O) so a sale would have to realize
even more than for it to be preferable to holding the asset until
maturity. This argument considers a sale only at time t = 0, but it
obviously generalizes to sales at other times. This proof depends heavily
on our assumption that all investors face the same capital gains tax.
The capital gains tax affects both the allocation of wine between
sectors, through B, and the efficiency with which resources in the wine
sector are used, through t. The signs of these effects are determinate.
Proposition 4: Both B and t are decreasing functions of T.
Proof: 1) Let G(B, T, t) = et(X(t)(l — ') + TB) ;
(B, T) = argmax G(B, T, t) and H(B, T) = G(B, T, i (B, T)) — B.
In equilibrium H(B, T) = — . But H1 = C1 + C3 — 1 = C1 — 1 =
I exp(—r(B, T)) — 1 < 0. The second step follows from the envelope theorem,
C3(B, T, (B, 1)) 0. Similarly
-LI
H2
= + =
C2
= (exp (—rJ(B, T)) (B — X(i(B, T)).
Thus letting t = 4'(B, T), -
_rt*( —(7) dBe <0dT
_rt*1 — Te
2) To calculate dt*/dT we note that B is a function of T and that
t maximizes F(t, T) = et (X(t )(1 — T) + TB(T)) so that t* must satisfy
(8) 0 = F1(t*, T) = —rF + ertXt(t*)(l — T).
Fdt* 12
Thus, a— = — i— and, since F11 < 0 by the second order conditions for11
maximizing F with respect to t, it follows that sign dt*/dT = sign F12.
But using (3), (7) and (8) we have that
F12 =
—rF2
— ertX?(t*)
=
_re_rt*(B — X + T dB/dT) — ertxl
= et*r
[(x - B
rt*
I )]_ rF T
_rt* [(x — B)e 1 rB= e r Le —T
[ X-B B
e —T
___ r .
__
=
—rL
< 0.rt *
e
18
Proposition 4 indicates that the effects of increasing the capital gains
tax on economic efficiency are complex. If inequality (4) holds —— as it
will whenever I < —- then increasing T improves efficiency by diverting
funds from the vine sector into the ordinary sector (dB/dt < 0) the effi-
ciency of the resources used in the wine sector will decrease as increasing
taxes causes wine to be harvested sooner than it should be (dt*/dT < 0).
2. Trees.
The analysis for trees is much simpler. As Lippman and McCall
(1980) have observed, the optimal cutting time u* is independent of the
rate at which a proportional capital gains tax is levied. We model the
elfect of the capital gains tax by assuming the owner of a tree pays a tax on
the increase in the tree's value from P, its initial cost, to V(u). Thus,
assuming he plants another tree, his after tax cash flow at time u is
(V(u) — P)(1 — T) + P — P = (V(u) — P)(l — j). Thus (2) is changed to
(9) L(u) = —P + e((V(u) — P)(l — T) + p — p)
+ e_r2u (V(u) — P)(l — T) +
= — + V(u) (1 — T)
— 1
so that u is chosen to maximize V(u) — P independent of T.
e — i
it is worth noting that this does not hold for all tree investments;
it is a consequence of the assumption that invesent opportunities in the
tree sector are stationary. If a plot of land will support a sequence of
trees each associated. with a planting cost P. and a potential value stream
VI, the sequence of cutting tznes {u) (u1, u2 ...) will be chosen to iiiaximize
L{u} =
—p1
+ e'1[(V1(u) — P1)(l — T) + (P1 —
+ —r(u1 + u2)[(V() - P2)(l - T) + (P2 - P3)]
r
= —P1 + E (exp — r( Uk)) Li(ti) — P)(l — T)1=1 k1
+ (P1 -
The optimal sequence {u*} will be independent of T if and —— for all practical
purposes —— only if P1 = P for all i. If the sequence of planting costs is
not stationary T will affect the efficiency of resource use in the tree sector.
Proposition 6: If planting costs are constant,tlu*} = {uJ-.
The analysis of total return in the tree sector has elements of the
analysis in the ordinary sector and of the analysis in the wine sector. To
deal with the non—stationary case we analyze total returns from one cycle of
investment. Total investment is land withdrawn from production for u periods
and the planting cost P. Total after tax returns are (V(u) — P)(l—T) P
Thus, we have, in equilibrium.
L(l—e') + P = (V(u) - P) (l—T) er + Pe'
Solving for total return we obtain
—ru L(u)(l—e1) + P Tprn
V(u)e = 1 — T
—
-j
A dollar of investment thus brings total returns equal to
1 T
—ru P
- L(l-e) + P
20
position 7. The present discounted value of total returns from a dollar
invested in the tree sector is 16 where u is the cutting time of the
tree and 6 is the ratio of planting Costs to total investment costs.
C. Accrual Taxation
It is sometimes asserted that many of the distortions and ineffi-
ciencies which the capital gains tax causes are due to the fact that capital
gains are taxed on a realization basis; if taxation were on an accrual basis
these distortions would disappear. We examine this claim by analyzing the
effect of accrual taxation on the efficiency of allocation of resources
between and within investment sectors. Our model does not support the
proposition that accrual taxation is to be preferred on efficiency grounds.
Accrual taxation introduces distortions different from, and in some cases
greater than, the distortions caused by realization taxation. While some
parameter values may favor accrual taxation, one cannot make a strong
apori case for it —— at least using the model of this paper. If anything
the evidence ses to run the other way. We observed above that in the
stationary case taxation on a realization basis does not affect the cutting
time of trees. We will see in Proposition 10 below that the cutting time
of trees is a decreasing function of the rate of accrual taxation.
1. Wine
We begin our analysis by noting that the effect of accrual taxation
on wine is to force investors to behave as if their discount rate were r/ (l—T)
rather than r; furtheroore, trees taxed on an accrual basis will be cut
down sooner than when taxed on a realization basis at the sane rate.
Proposition 8.
If taxed on an accrual basis
at rate T, wine with a growth path of X( )
will be harvested at time t where t satisfies Xt(t )/X(t ) = r/(l—T). The -a a a a
present discounted value of such wine is X(ta) exp—(r/l—T) ta• Furthermore
dt
< 0 and t < t where t is the harvesting time when wine is taxed on adT a
realization basis at rate T.
Proof:
1) The key to the proof is our assumption that taxes are levied on in—
creases in the market value of the wine. That is, if W(t) is the value of
the wine at time t, increases in W(t) must satisfy
(11) W(t) = e_t[W(tLt)(l_T) + TW(t)J.
This formula assumes that the investor bought the tree for W(t) in period
t and sold it for W(t+&) in period t+At realizing an after tax return of
(l—T)W(t+4t) + TW(t); if Lt is sufficiently small there is no difference
between taxation on an accrual basis and taxation on a realization basis.
Using Taylor series to evaluate the right hand side of (11) and discarding
all terms of order (t)2 or greater we see that W(t)rt = W'(t)(1—T)T or,
Wv
—
r
W l-T
This first order differential equation describes the evolution of W(t),
the value of the tree. A boundary condition is that W(t) = X(ta) if the
tree is cut dow-n at time t. Thus, the present discounted value of a tree
taxed on an accrual basis at rate r which will be cut do-n at t Is just
X(ta)e_(r/(l_T))ta. Clearly ta shauld be chosen to axIze this value.
2) That dt /dt < 0 follows iiinediately from the fact that > o.a dT
3) Let t be the cutting time when taxed on a realization basis with
basis B. Then
_____ = r {1 + j+i: X(t*) j < r + J =
X'(t )
= r(l + r/(l—T) =
Since X'(t)/X(t) is a decreasing function of t, ta <
We thus see that accrual taxation leads to a more inefficient use of
resources within the wine sector thar taxation on a realization basis at
the same rate. We note that if T = the rate which investors use to
discount returns in the wine sector is eoual to the gross or pretax rate
of return in the ordinary section. If T = T0, y = —f-— . Define the gross
1 —T
rate of return R as the solution to
lryJ e_R5ds=
so that R = y = r/(l-T), the discount rate used by private investors
facing accrual taxation at rate T in the wine sector. This observation is
of somewhat limited interest as r, not R, is the social rate of discount; it
is not efficient to decide when to harvest wine by using the rate R as a
discount rate.
Accrual taxation does not lead to the correct allocation of resources
between the wine and the ordinary sector even when I = T0
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Proposition 9
The present discounted value of a dollar of resources invested in wine
is exp[rt T/(l—T)].
Proof:
Consider one dollar invested in wine
which goes to produce wine har-
vested at ta and worth X(ta) at that time. Gross returns are clearly
X(t)ea. Hower, in
equilibrium the present discounted value of
(r/(l_T))ta
after tax returns is equal to one dollar so X(ta) = e
Substituting, we find gross returns from one dollar are
exp[t(r/(l—-r) — r)] = exp[rtT/(1—T)].
Since gross returns are the sum of private returns and the present
rta T/l—Tdiscounted value of taxes paid this latter amount must be e — 1
per dollar invested in wine.
We note that whether the total return from investments in wine are
greater or less than returns in the ordinary sector depends on whether
rt (T/(l—T))
>(12) (l—T)e a < 1
Because ta is a function of T, the expression on the left hand side of (12)
is quite complicated to analyze. We give examples in Appendix Il-A which
show that this expreion can be greater or less than 1, that it can be
increasing or decreasing in I, and that its limit as i approaches 1 can
be either 0 or .
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2. Trees
The effects of accrual taxation on trees are also straightforward.
The analysis of Proposition 8 applies. A tree cut down after u years of
growth yields an after—tax return with a present discounted value of
V(u)e' T)• If planting a tree costs P, a plot of land on which trees
are planted yields returns which are equivalent to the payment of
V(u)e(T) — P Ut times 0, u, 2u Thus the value of land is
, . —ur/(l—r)
(13) L(u) = Vu,e — P
—ru1— e
The optimal cutting time, U, is chosen to maximize the right hand side
of (13). It is immediately clear from (13) that Ua is not, as in the
realization case, independent of the rate of capital gains taxation. We
du
show in Proposition 10 that < 0. The optimal cutting time is, as
analyzed above, U. If the rate of capital gains taxation is zero then U =
Thus accrual taxation leads to trees being cut down too soon.
Proposition 10.
The optimal cutting time for trees which are taxed on an accrual basis
is a decreasing function of the tax rate.
Proof:
By definition
\T(u)exp(—ru /(l—T)) — p
(14) u argmax
-a ruu l—e
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Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions imply
(15) P < V(u )exp (—ru 1(1—i))— a a
r /(1—-r))](16) (UaT) = [V'(u) exp (_rua/(l_T)) — V(u)(1—) exp a
—ru
[1 — e a — [—P + V(u ) exp (—ru /(1—i))] re aa a
—ru 2
a[1—e ] =0.
Thus
a
__
dT
— —
asp/aua
and, since < 0 by second order conditions,
a a a a a
du
—ru /V'(u )u
)
ru
—rusign = sign
-
= sign (e a — 1, + 1 + (1—-rea
Rearranging the first order condition (16), we find that
(
V'(u )u —ru ru
—ru Pu
—ru rua
a÷1) a a a ___
a
(e
a
— 1) + i-: (1 — Te = V(U reV(u ) '(1—i) Ia
-ru+e a1
Tnus.
• _ . a a / a\ adu (u —ru ru —ru
}sign..
—
sign-(- Pre — 1a
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From ( 15) we know that P < V(u) P a/(1_T)) which implies
(17
V(u) Pr ea exp (rua/(l_T)) + ea — 1 < (u r+1)e a 1
The right hand side of (17 ) attains a maximum over u r > 0 when u r 0.
-ru du a aAt this point (ur + 1)e a — 1 = 0. Thus, -< 0.
When we analyze the gross returns to investment in trees with accrual
taxation, we get a result which is similar to Proposition 9.
Proposition 11:
If capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis at rate T, the gross
return to one dollar invested in trees is exp (ruaT/(l_T)).
Proof: To see this, consider again an investment in a single tree. Land
worth L(u ) is used for a period of u and resources worth P are used toa a
—(r/(1—T)u
plant the tree. These costs bring a private return of V(Ua) e a,
Total returns from these costs are V(u) e a Thus the ratio of total
returns to private returns, which is also in equilibrium the gross return
to an investment of one dollar, is exp (ruaT/(1_T)).
The discussion following Proposition 9 applies here. Whether the rate
of return to trees taxed on an accrual basis is greater or less than the
rate of return in the ordinary sector depends on the nature of the function
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v( ). It is well known that as P increases to the point where L(Ua) = 0,
Ua converges to ta; that Ua satisfies V'(Ua)/V(U) = r/(l—T). Thus,
the examples of Appendix II.A demonstrate that (l_T)exp(rua'r/(l_T) can be
increasing or decreasing in T and that lim (lT)exp(ruaT/(1_T)) can be
T1
either 0 or .
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II. Inflation
A. The Ordinary Sector
We model inflation in the ordinary sector by assuming that a dollar
invested yields a stream of gross returns y(s)e. The after tax rate
of return, ', is now the solution to
(18) 1 = f y(s)e(l — T)e'8ds.
If r is the after tax rate of return in the ordinary sector without infla-
tion, it is straightforward to show that ' = r + r; r + r is the rate
which investors will use to discount all future benefits.
If goverrnnent revenues are used efficiently a dollar of tax revenue
collected at time s has a present discounted value equal to
Thus, the present discounted value of taxes collected is again l— As
in the case with no inflation, a dollar invested in the ordinary sector
produces a total stream of returns with present discounted value equal
to (l—T).
B. The Austrian Sectors
Our analysis of the effects of inSlaton on the Austrian sectors
focuses on the two distortions examined earlier. Table 1 summarizes the
effects of inflation on selling time and value of gross return for wine
and trees under both accrual taxation and taxation on a realization basis.
The details of the derivation of the entries in Table 1 are tedious and
are given in Appendix II . Here we surzaarize and explain the results.
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Under accrual taxation, the analysis of the effects of inflation is
straightforward, but the effects themselves defy simple summary. About all
that can be said is that inflation complicates —— sometimes exacerbating
and sometimes alleviating -- the distortions induced by taxation. If the
inflation rate is ri and the tax rate is T, wine taxed on an accrual basis
is exactly the same as wine which is untaxed but discounted at a rate
1— T
From (18) inflation can be modeled by assuming that the discount rate rises
to r+n while the nominal value of wine sold at time t equals X(t)eflt. Thus,
wine harvested at time t has a present discounted after tax value of
t I / 1 r (r+flT)
X(t)e11 exp — ir+fl) ti = X(t) .exp t
L (l—T) J L (l—T)
The selling time of wine, t, maximizes the expression above. This gives
us the first order condition
X'(t)
—
r+flT
x (t) 1—T
The right hand side of this equation is increasing in fl. Thus, ta is
decreasing in ri.
The calculation of the present discounted value of gross returns
under inflation is similar to that of Proposition 9, only now the discount
rate r+fl is substituted for r; the gross rate of return is
exp [(r+fl) taT/(1_Tfli
which, as examples in Appendix II.B show, can be increasing or decreasing in fl.
Trees are again more complicated than wine but the effects of inflation
are cualitatively the same. The optimal cutting time Ua satisfies
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(r+Tfl)V(u) exp [- 1—T u] — P
Ua = argrnax
_______________
U
—ru
1 —e
This is similar to the expression in the case without inflation, (14),
with r+flT substituted for —i-—1—i 1—T
The proof that the optimal cutting time u is decreasing in r is
left to Appendix II.C. Since V(ua)exp[_(r+flT)/(l_T)Jua and not
V(Ua)exp[_1/(1_T)](ua)is the present discounted after tax rate of return
to investing in trees, the argument used to establish Proposition 11.
also establishes that the gross rate of return to investment in trees
is equal to exp[(r+r)uT/(l—T)]. Again, since Ua approaches ta when
L(ua) -- 0, the examples in Appendix II.B show that this expression can
either increase or decrease as r increases.
The analysis of inflation with taxation at realization is somewhat
less straightforward, although the results themselves fit into a simple
pattern. Consider first wine. The present discounted value of the after
tax return from wine with basis B, sold at date t is
(20) W(t,T,rI) = e_ +fl)t[X(t)euit(1_T) + TB]
= e_rtX(t) (l—T) + e_(tTB
The owner of wine with base B will choose a harvesting time t*(i,n) which
solves
ax W(t,T,fl)t
The first order condition which t* must satisfy is
(21) (t*,T,n) = e_ r)t*{_rX(t*)eflt*(l_T) —
nt*
—(rr+r)TB + X'(t*)e (1—i)) 0
Let W*(T,fl) = W(t*(T,rl), T,fl). In equilibrium investments earn a competitive
rate of return so that
(22) B = B(T,rl) = W*(T,fl) = Max e_ +n)t{x(t)ent(l_T) + TB(T,r) }.
Rearranging, we find that
"23" B"T ., = X(t*(T,r1))(l_T/ ' rt
_Tlt*
-
[e —e
Applying the implicit function theorem to (21) we find that
(24) sign = sign[(r4r)t* - i+iet)t1
At low rates of inflation increases in fl can increase or decrease selling
time, depending on the evolution of x(•). In Appendix II.D we provide
dt
examples where is greater than, less than, and equal to zero. As
rj=O
r approaches the problem the owner of wine faces converges to the problem
he would face if his basis 'ere zero and there were no inflation. That
is,
—rt
W(t,T, ) = e X(t)(l—i).
-'
dt*
Thus, since tk < t, for sufficiently large ri, > 0, and asymptotically,
increases in the rate of inflation correct the distortion in selling
time which the capital gains tax causes. Tnis asymptotic behavior is
further il1ustrat by the gross returns on in'esent in vine. A
invesent of one dollar vine y an after ta: retr --h a
present discounted value of
_(r+fl)t*(25) e [X(t*)eflt*(l_T)+T]
if wine is sold at t*. The present discounted value of gross benefits
generated by this dollar is X(t*)ert. Setting (25) equal to one and
rearranging we find
(26) X(t*)e_rt* = 1 + [l-.e
—lAlthough this is less than (l—T)
,
as i approaches (26) converges to
(1—T). Thus, for large increases in decrease the distortions of
the capital gains tax.
A similar argument shows that inflation increases the present dis-
counted value of gross returns to investments in trees taxed on a
realization basis. If T = T , inflation reduces the distortion which the0
capital gains tax induces.
In contrast to the case of accrual taxation, these
results fit into a
simple pattern. Inflation, at least inflation at a rapid rate, reduces the
distortions which a tax on realized
capital gains induces. There is a
straightfoard explanation. The distortions which this tax induces stem
from the exclusion of the base value of the asset from the tax base.
Inflation reduces the value and the effect of this exclusion.
One entry in Table 1 does not fit this neat pattern. With no inflation
trees taxed at realization are cut down
at the socially optimal time. As
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inflation increases, the cutting time of trees increases; inflation induces
inefficiency. The proof of this fact is tedious and given in the appendix.
However, there is a simple intuitive explanation. Inflation and taxation
interact to make it appear to the investor that planting costs have
increased. The investor chooses u to maximize
[V(u)e(1—T) + TPe — Pe)
= e_r[V(u)(l_T) + TPe — P].
i=1
While in any period he must pay planting Costs of P, when he pays taxes
he can only exclude Pe from his tax base. Effective planting costs
have increased. The natural response is to use less planting by increasing
the time between plantings.
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III. Death and Taxes
Death complicates. Until 1976, in the United States, when the holder
of an asset died, the estate paid no capital gains tax; if the investor's
heirs sold the asset in the future the basis value of the asset used to
compute capital gains tax liability was its value on the date of the
investor's death. From the point of view
of the estate, death was equi-
valent to a sale on the date of death
which escaped capital gains taxation.
Although death may not have had much else to recommend it, it was a dandy
way to avoid taxes. This system ws changed in 1976, and the U.S. began
to wove toward a system like that analyzed in Part I in which the heir's
basis would be the basis of the
original purchaser of the asset.. In 1980,
this movement stopped; and the U.S. has reverted to the pre—1976 system.
In this part of the paper we analyze the effect of the capital gains
tax on the selling time and value of Austrian assets when death alters the way
in which capital gains are taxed. Special treatment of capital gains at
death alters, and in some cases reverses, our conclusions about the effect
of the capital gains taxes on selling time.
Let F(t) be the probability that the owner of wine lives until at
least period t. Then F(0) = 1, F(°) = 0 and F(t) is decreasing. For
Simplicity we assume F(t) is differentiable and let f(t) = F'(t). If the
probability of death is constant then F(t) = e and f(t) =
—ye'. Let
be the rate of capital gains taxation at death. We consider two values
of Td, Td Q corresponds to the present U.S. system which is known
as atonatjc step up in basis or step up for short. Under step up, capital
gains ta::es are avoided at death.
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Another possible treatment of capital gains at death is what is known
as constructive realization. Under this system the estate is presumed to
sell the asset at death and to pay tax at the ordinary capital gains rate
on the gains which the sale realizes. Under constructive realization
= T. We compare these two systems to the system analyzed in the last
part which is referred to as a carryover system.
If an investor plans to sell an asset at t, the expected present dis-
counted value of the after tax proceeds is
(27) J(t) = e_rtF(t)(X(t)(l_T) +TB) — f e_rs(X(s)(l_Td) + TdB))f(s)ds.
The first term in (27) represents the discounted after tax value he will
receive if he lives until t. The second term is the discounted after tax
value which his estate will receive. This formula is not quite correct for
two reasons. First, the pretax value the estate realizes will in general
be more than X(t) since the value of the asset will exceed X(t). Determining
exactly what this value is seems very difficult. Secondly, in contrast to
the analysis of Section I above, B here is an arbitrary parameter. Although
in principle B should satisfy a zero profit condition, it is hard to write
down this condition for this model because investors'mortality functions will
influence their profits. It is hard to figure out what should be the
"market" mortality function. We think neither of these simplifications will
affect our analysis.
The planned selling time t is chosen to maximize J(t); t satisfies
(28) X'(t*) = r [1 T B] + TLd f() Ix (t*) L l—T X(t*) J l—-t P(t*) L — X(t*)
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Proposition 12:
For capital gains taxation at the same rate, planned selling time is
the same under constructive realization as under carryover. Planned cutting
time is greater under step up.
Proof:
Since f(t) ( 0, this follows immediately from (28).
Note that planned selling time is not the same as actual selling
times. Under either step up or constructive realization an investor's heirs
may plan to sell an asset at a different time than the
original investor
planned. This is because the heirs will have a different, higher basis
which will cause them to plan to sell sooner than the original investor.
They also will have a different mortality function which
will, under step
up also affect their planned selling time. It is easy to see from (27) that
increases in either T or Td will decrease the value of an asset.
The effects of increases in T on planned selling time are more compli-
cated. Since planned selling time is the same under constructive reali—
zatio.n as under carryover, dt*/dT < 0 in both cases. Under step up dt*/dT
can be either positive or negative. If B = 0, the selling time will be
greater under step up then if there were no taxation so must be positive.
f(t*)On the other hand if B is positive and — j:t*) is very snail, will bef(t*)negative -- as It is when = 0. For simplicity we have given the
analysis only for the case of wine, a similar analysis for trees shows that
u satisfies
V'(u*)
—
___I__ +
L ] + T_Td f(u*) [ pV (5  r
L
1—i V(u*) V(u*)(l_T)j l—T F(u*) [ T(u*)
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Appendix I — Frequently Used Notation
y(s) Rate of flow of returns from investmei-its in the ordinary sector
s years after the initial investment.
X(t) Value of wine if consumed t years after it is laid down.
B Base or initial value of investment in wine.
V(u) Value of a tree if cut down u years after planting.
P Planting cost of a tree.
L Value of land used to grow a sequence of trees.
t Selling time which maximizes present discounted value of total
returns to investments in wine.
u Cutting time which maximizes present discounted value of total
returns to investment in trees.
Selling time which maximizes private after tax returns to invest—
ments in wine taxed on a realization basis.
Cutting time which maximizes present discounted value of after
tax returns to investments in trees taxed on a realization basis.
t Privately optimal selling time for wine taxed on an accrual basis.
Privately optimal selling time for trees taxed on an accrual basis.
r After tax rate of return.
6 Ratio of planting costs to total costs of investments in trees.
T0 Rate of taxation in ordinary sector.
T Rate of taxation in Austrian sectors.
Rate of taxation of capital gains at death
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APPENDIX II
A. Let A(t) = (l—t) exp where t is the solution to
X'(t
X ( = r/(1—T).
1. Consider X(t) pt. Then t = (1—T)/r, A(T) = (l_T)eT; A(O) 1,
A'(T) = — ie < 0 and A(1) = 0.
0
2. Let X(t) = for d >
i(t—d) c >d 4r
Then t = d + (1—T)/r and
A(T) = (1—T) exp [T(1 + (rd/(1—T))fl.
A(O) = 1; A'(t) = T]exp[T(l + (rd/(l-T)))] > 0, and
urn A(T) =
t+1
(This example may appear to violate the requirement that X'(t)JX(t) be
decreasing as X'(t)/X(t) is undefined for t< d; however, since
1X (t)/X(t) =
—j , it is decreasing for t > d. Moreover,
X'(t)/X(t) has but a single local maximum.)
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B.
1. Let C(ri) exp [(r+fl)t T/(1—T)J where c satisfies
X'(ta)IX(ta) = (r+Trl)/(1_T).
Let X(t) = jit. Then we know from example 1 of Appendix II.A that
C(O) < (1—T)1 for T > 0 so that if C'(O) > 0 the distortions induced
by the capital gains tax are reduced by small increments in the race
of inflation. For this case, t = (l—T)/(r+Tfl); C(n) exp [T(r+n)J(r+Tfl)J,
and C'(fl) = C(fl)r(l—T)t/(r+Tfl)2 so inflation at low races reduces
distortions. However, liin C() = e and if e > (1—T)' (or if T < .632),
n-3w
then high rates of inflation more than correct the distortions induced by
the capital gains tax. Increases in inflation beyond the point where
C(n) = (1_T)1 increase distortions.
2. For a more dramatic
example of this effect, consider again the
case where
t<d
1X(t) = for d >
( P(t—d) i: > d r
Tb en
ta = d + (l—r)/(r--Tfl)
so that
C(n) exp [(r+n)dT/(1—T) +
It is easy to calculate that C'() > 0. We showed in example 2 of
Appendix II.A that C(0) > (1—T) so increasing inflation exacerbates
the distortions of the capital gains tax.
42
3. For an example where C'() can be negative let X(t) = ut + k
where k > 0. Then t = — anda r+Tfl p
[rft÷JJ k(r+fl)T]
C() exp
r+Tfl p(l—t)
1—T)r kIt is easy to show that for 0 < I < 1 sign [C'()] = sign
[ r+Tfl)2
—
p(l—i) ]For k > C'(n) < 0.
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C. position A.l. The optimal cutting time of trees taxed on an accrual
basis is decreasing in T), the rate of inflation.
Proof: The optimal cutting time Ua solves
,r+Tfl
'U
Max V(u)e -P
U
-ru
1 —e
Assuming an interior solution, the first—order conditions imply
- ____l—T ,U(A.l) P < V(ua) e
r+TT1 r+Tfl
j—t )Ua r+Tfl l-T )ua _rua(A.2) 4(ua,fl,T) = {[V'(ua)e — V(ua)(1T ) e ][l—e
r+Tfl)u -ru
-ru 2
— [V(ua) e l—T - PIre a} (l—e a) =
du -a
Thus, = and, since L < 0 from the second—order conditions,
aa
du
—ru V'(u )ua a a a
sign = sign = sign V(ua) { (e — 1) [ V(ua) + 1]
-ru
-ru
+ [r(l—re a) + TIT(l — e a)])
Rearranging the first—order condition (A.2), we find that
V' (Ua)ua
_rua ua —ruV(ua) + 1) (e — 1) + — [r(l—Te ) + ryr(1 — e LI
r+ Tfl
—
ua ru rF)ua Ua
V() Pre e +e —1.
Thus,
du u
-ru (r+tfl) —rua
r a a l-T a a
s1gn---- = sign Pre e +e —1).
V (Ua)
4L+
,r+Tfl
— 1T )ua
From (A.1) we know that P < V(Ua) e ,.whichiinplies
Ua rua (r±Tfl)u rua
(A.3) Pre e -e -1 < (ur+1)e a1
V(Ua) a
The right-hand side of (A.3) attains a maximum over uar > 0 when
-ru dua
uar = 0. At this point (uar + 1)e a - 1 = 0. Thus, < 0.dii —
L5
D.
In this section, we show that with wine taxed on a realization basis,
at low rates of inflation an increase in ri can increase or decrease selling
time. We give examples where is greater than, less than, and
dfl tl=O
equal to zero.
0 t<d
1. Let X(t) = — where d > 0.
p(t-d) t> d
1 TBThen from (21), with n = 0, t' = — + d - — — and from (22) and (23)r 1—Tn
rT B
-1-dr+
W*(T,0) = (l—t) e (l_T)P . From (24) this implies that
r
rat*] = sin[ra - (1-T) ITsign d
Inserting the condition B = W*(T,0) from (22), we see that the right-hand
dt*J >0side of the above equation equals sign[rd. Since rd > 0,
=o
2. Let x(t) = pt + c where c > 0. Setting = 0, (21) implies
1 c TBthat t = — — — — — — , and from (22) and (23),
r 1-' 1—TP
-i+E
p(l—T) e ' (l—T) .iW*(T,0) = r
Inserting this value of t into (24) and setting n = 0, we find
TrBdt*
cr — Tr B (1T)iisign [ln=o]= s [ - T -rign + te
Setting B = W*(T,0), the right-hand side of this equation becomes
dt* Isign [_2-J• Thus, if C equals Zero = 0, while if c is greater
than zero dt*J <0.d n=0
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E. Proposition A.2. For trees taxed at realization, the optimal cutting
time, u, is increasing in r.
Proof: An investor with a plot of land which can support one tree forever
chooses to cut each tree planted after u years, where u solves
-rut -fluMax - P + • e [V(u) (l—T) + TPe - PJ
u 11
= Max V(u) (l-T) + P[te' - eru}
U e'—l
Assuming an interior solution, a first—order condition for this problem is
ru* _flu* ru*
= {[(1_T)V(u*) — (re + rre )P][e — 1]
ru* ru* flu* ru* 2
— re [(l_T)V(u*) — (e — Te )P)} + (e — 1) = 0.
du*
Thus =
----
and, since — < 0 from the second—order conditions,
—
3u*
sign = sign ---- sign { [ (r+fl)u* — l}e + (1_flu*) }•fl
Rearranging, we find that
[(r+fl)u*_l)e + (l_flu*) = flu*(e — 1) + (ru* — l)eru + 1 >
ru*
>flu*(e —1) >0.
du*Thus — > 0.
